Trump will resist spending his political capital on Venezuela's transition. The opposition needs to reduce the costs of supporting them

Article in La Silla Vacía

[The following is a presentation that I gave in private event last week, which I shaped up for publication, in Colombian media outlet La Silla Vacía. You can read it in Spanish here.]

Almost two months after Operation Absolute Resolve, the Trump administration continues its tutelary control over Venezuela, obliging changes in its economic policies and international alliances as well as progress in the release of political prisoners. Polls show solid majorities of Venezuelans in favor of these changes as well as a cautious sense of optimism. The Trump administration has released no time frame for new elections or any real plan for a return to democracy, preferring to speak simply in terms of “transition.” In this context, it is important to think about the future of the Trump administration’s engagement in Venezuela. I suggest that it is likely to continue throughout three years Trump remains in office. The real question is with what degree of focus and strength and in what direction. To understand this, it is important to think back to how the relationship has evolved over the past couple of years.

After Nicolás Maduro stole the July 2024 presidential elections, opposition leader María Corina Machado returned her focus to an international strategy, demanding international recognition of Edmundo González as the rightful president of Venezuela, and reiterating the idea that Venezuela is a narcostate and hub for organized crime that threatens the entire region, including the United States. The obvious purpose of this international securitization of the Venezuela conflict was to get international stakeholder nations to intervene in Venezuela.

Little response was received from the Biden administration, but candidate Donald Trump picked up this message and used the renewed international opprobrium of Nicolás Maduro to make Venezuelan migrants and the Tren de Aragua the centerpiece of the final months of his campaign. María Corina Machado’s team built upon this narrative, communicating to Trump’s incoming team that Nicolás Maduro was directing of the Tren de Aragua.

This fit nicely with their existing goals and Trump used this to put into effect within weeks using it to justify the Alien Enemies Act to deport Venezuelan men without trial to the Center for Terrorist Confinement in El Salvador. As well, reports from the New York Times and Washington Post suggest that justifying use of the Alien Enemies Act was also part of the military operation in Venezuela. Showing that there is indeed military conflict with Venezuela is key to the case that is under appeal in federal courts.

María Corina Machado also internationalized this conflict by underlining the $1.7 trillion investment opportunity that Venezuela presented. This was heard too by Donald Trump and by December 2025 he was presenting oil as the main motivation for this military operation. Why? Because by that time the polling was clear that the US public did not support military action in Venezuela and there was a flood of analyses arguing that an attempt at regime change would be a disaster.

As we all know, Trump did launch a military strike in early January but it was an intervention with very unique characteristics. Instead of “overwhelming force” followed by occupation—as happened in Afghanistan and Iraq—the U.S. entered and exited Venezuela in a matter of hours, with Maduro in handcuffs but his regime intact. The operation was no longer about drugs or the Tren de Aragua or regime change. It was presented to the public as focusing on U.S. companies gaining access to Venezuela again. So far we have not seen any concrete plans for elections and in fact scarce mention of democracy and Venezuela’s Nobel Laureate María Corina Machado has been decisively snubbed.

What lessons can we take from these experiences? That Trump is going to listen to Venezuelans but actively repurpose their messages for his own needs. What he wants from Venezuela is a prosperous, friendly nation:

· that fits into his National Security Strategy of eliminating threats and gaining strategic control of resources,

· that Venezuelans in the U.S. will want to or at least will not resist going back to, and

· will not dominate his focus and drain his political capital.

So what does the coming year look like? The first most relevant factor is the current U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran that could absorb the Trump administration’s attention for some time to come, and will likely drag on his popularity even further. Trump is already fifteen points underwater in approval ratings headed to midterm elections in seven months. It is likely Republicans will lose control of the House of Representatives, and quite possibly the Senate. In the coming seven months he is unlikely to use his political capital for substantial change in the current course of economic stabilization, for example by facilitating María Corina Machado’s return and calling elections.

If the midterms lead Donald Trump to lose the House it is likely that it would initiate proceedings to force a vote on the War Powers Act. A Democratic or diminished Republican Senate would likely support it. Of course, the War Powers Act does not necessarily control the Trump’s use of force. Indeed January 3 was framed in terms of military support for law enforcement against Nicolás Maduro. Trump did not seek congressional approval for his attack on Iran either. Like the many strikes on go-fast boats in the Caribbean and Pacific it has been undertaken as a response to an imminent threat.

However, it is clear that here again, Congress will be less likely to tolerate these tortured arguments after the midterm elections and this will diminish the credible threat of force, which has been the foundation of his control over the government of Delcy Rodriguez. In this case, the most likely future is for U.S. tutelage to slowly diminish in strength and if the Venezuelan economy recovers and U.S. industry makes progress in investment in Venezuela, the Trump administration will be able to declare victory without any decisive push for new elections.

It is also unlikely that congressional democrats will pick up the Venezuela banner and push for a democratic transition. While many undoubtedly sympathize with the Venezuelan cause, they are unlikely to use their political capital to save Trump’s Venezuela policy when they are in the midst of what many interpret as a fight for the future of U.S. democracy.

What could the Venezuelan opposition do to try gain relevance in this process of accommodation between the Trump administration and the government of Delcy Rodriguez? U.S. intervention in Iran confirms what is emerging as Trump’s unique approach to regime change. He does not look for the most central and notorious opposition figure but rather the leader most capable of unifying, keeping the peace and collaborating with the U.S. As he did with Venezuela , where he pushed aside María Corina Machado, it appears that Trump has rejected Reza Pahlavi—son of the late Shah of Iran, overthrown in 1980. In the past year, Pahlavi has positioned himself as the natural leader of a transition, ready to return to the country. In the process he has shown himself to be a divisive figure, attacking other Iranian dissidents instead of trying to unify them.

To get themselves into the game again, Venezuelan opposition actors need to lower the costs for actors in the U.S. government who want to push for democracy, by putting forward a unified, gregarious, bridge-building face. They should seek to inspire the population by highlighting the possibilities for reconciliation, instead of by mobilizing their [justified] anger at Chavismo. Inside Venezuela and outside, they could organize processes of listening and reconciliation within a diverse opposition through an actual debate of ideas, rather than arid ad hominem attacks. As well they could show themselves willing and capable of working with the moderates of Chavismo who will be fundamental to any imaginable constructive future. There is no guarantee that any of this would change the opposition’s marginalization. But it would better prepare them for the future than the current strategy, which has clearly run its course.